SAFETY CONCERNS AT FIRE DISTRICT RESURFACE

Former Safety Officer Speaks Out

SUMMARY: Last January, former Mount Holly Fire District Safety Officer Tim Young claimed that disputes and other problematic behaviors amongst the Fire District Commissioners created a safety issue for firefighters. Young described specific unprofessional behaviors, failures to promptly and appropriately complete personnel actions and policy updates, and interference with operational decisions. Young indicated that these problems with “the Board” were responsible for outdated procedures and leadership chaos. The leadership confusion caused firefighters to disagree about who was in charge and became source of insubordination. Young predicted that eventually these conditions would lead to people getting hurt or killed. After months of waiting for his report to get action, Young resigned on May 16^th

THE REPORT

On January 7, 2026, Mr. Tim Young supplied a safety report to the Chair and Vice Chair of the Fire District Board of Commissioners. The report said fractious behavior on the Board and failures to process Standard Operating Procedure and Personnel updates were causing problems on the operational side of the Fire District. Young waited for months in hopes that Commissioners would address concerns in his safety report. But when no one on the Board reached out to him to discuss those problems, he concluded that continuing as Safety Officer was tacit consent for the lack of action. And so, on May 16^th 2026, Mr. Young resigned his position as Safety Officer at the Mount Holly Fire District [see reprinted letter below].

As prescient as Mr. Young’s safety report seems to be, it suffers from a lack of specificity with respect to individuals at blame.

“My concerns were with the Board of Fire Commissioners as the governing body: failure to follow its own policies, failure to properly review safety reports, failure to maintain clear operational authority, and repeated interference or confusion between governance and operations.”

Tim Young

Young’s valid concerns deserved the Board’s attention, but when The Reporter pressed him for more context about who was responsible for the personnel issues he called out, he responded that “I don’t have much insight into your follow up”. When The Reporter observed that his report needed context to be more useful, he responded that he had become “uninterested in assisting” with an exploration of the details.

And so, the Reporter will attempt provide clarifying context without the aid of Mr. Young.

WHAT HAPPENED?

On January 7, 2026, newly elected Fire Commissioner Jules Thiessen was settling into his seat as Chairman of Mt. Holly Fire District. The outgoing Chair Nicole Saucier, who was also the person in charge of the Personnel and Policy Committee during 2025, had just been elected Vice Chair of the Commission.

Jules and Nicole were the only two commissioners who received Mr. Young’s safety report that day by email.

The report was not forwarded to Commissioners Rosemarie Logue or Jeena Sheppard.

To be fair to Thiessen, the report arrived on what was essentially his first day and at a moment when the Board was consumed by chaotic events and battles. First came the lawyer resignations. Then came a roller coaster of accusations that a new lawyer found by Thiessen was a “pay to play” hire. Next came a misfeasance scandal when Commissioner Saucier opened a lawyer bid without authorization, “spoiling” the whole bidding process and forcing it to be rebid. And then the high drama a months-long personnel investigation that concluded with a legal recommendation to terminate suspended Director Jason Carty. The recommendation was not heeded. Thiessen and 2 other commissioners were deemed to have conflicts of interest that prevented them from voting, and the remaining Commissioners had a tie vote. As a result, Carty remains on indefinite paid administrative leave. And to top off this chaos, Carty’s interminable suspension meant that Mr. Thiessen had to continue shouldering the Fire Director’s duties on the operational side of the district. Thiessen has just passed his 6^th month as “temporary” Fire Director.

True, Mr. Thiessen sought the office and accepted the responsibilities of being Chair, so the report was his to review and act upon. But no one should deny that Mr. Young’s critique of the Commission came at a particularly distracted time for Thiessen.

But what of his Vice Chair Saucier? She no longer had to deal with the Fire Director duties or the Policy and Personnel Committee that she shouldered during late 2025. And yet apparently one of her first decisions as Vice Chair was to withhold Mr. Young’s safety report from her fellow commissioners Logue and Sheppard.

“That report was neither meaningfully reviewed nor acted upon. It was not formally accepted, discussed, or resolved at that meeting or any meeting since. No corrective action has been taken. No urgency has been demonstrated. No accountability has been shown.” Tim Young resignation letter

The content of Young’s critique in his resignation letter is correct, but the generic application of blame to “the Board” was inappropriate. It should be placed at the feet of the people who actually were in receipt of this report: Jules Thiessen and Nicole Saucier. They were the only Commissioners that Young notified.

Likewise with regard to the “officer appointment” issues Young mentioned in his safety report, authority over personnel and policy was in the hands of Commissioner Nicole Saucier and June Gaskill during the period of time he addressed.

Much of the fractiousness Young complains of at Board meetings were the result of disputes between the Saucier/Gaskill duo versus Rosemarie Logue and Jeena Sheppard who complained about poor communication.

But complain as they might, they could not overcome the 3-2 vote deficit they faced at every Fire District meeting. It was not until Mr. Thiessen arrived that Ms. Logue and Ms. Sheppard began to receive a modicum of respect with regard to hearing their perspectives.

Mr. Young’s reports were accurate in their description of problem areas. It is a shame that Logue and Sheppard were not appraised of his concerns prior to his resignation in May. Perhaps they could have joined with Thiessen to get the long awaited action sought by Mr. Young.

RESIGNATION LETTER

Board of Fire Commissioners

Mount Holly Fire District No. 1

May 16, 2026

To The Board

Effective May 17, 2026, I am resigning from my position as Department Safety Officer and as a member of Mount Holly Fire District No. 1.

This decision is not abrupt. It is the result of months of inaction, disregard, and a complete failure to address documented safety concerns that were formally presented to this Board. My January report outlined significant and escalating risks, including breakdown of command structure, lack of approved SOPs/SOGs, improper officer appointment processes, and deteriorating morale impacting operational readiness. These were not minor issues. They were, and remain, direct threats to firefighter safety and organizational stability.

That report was neither meaningfully reviewed nor acted upon. It was not formally accepted, discussed, or resolved at that meeting or any meeting since. No corrective action has been taken. No urgency has been demonstrated. No accountability has been shown.

At this point, continuing in the role of Safety Officer would require me to knowingly maintain responsibility for risks that are outside of my control and clearly being ignored at the governance level. I am not willing to carry that liability.

I fully believe that if current conditions persist, a serious injury or line-of-duty death is not a remote possibility, but an eventual outcome. The contributing factors have already been identified, documented, and communicated. The failure to act is no longer an oversight, it is a choice.

Since my acceptance into this department on November 10, 2014, I have observed a consistent pattern: persistent complaints about problems, paired with a complete unwillingness to fix them. I can no longer be part of an organization that operates this way, especially when the consequences are measured in firefighter safety.

All issued uniforms and keys have been left at the Safety Officer desk. A flash drive containing all of my files has also been left on that desk.

I currently host the credential pages associated with firefighter ID badges. I will continue to host these pages temporarily; however, they will no longer be updated. The District must develop and implement an alternative system. These pages will be permanently deleted at a later date, not to exceed one year from my resignation. This letter serves as formal notice of my resignation from all roles within the District.

Tim Young Department Safety Officer (Resigned)

JANUARY SAFETY REPORT

For: December 2025
Prepared: January 5, 2026

Coordinated with Extinguisher Services for fire extinguisher annual servicing. All extinguishers and hood system have been serviced for 2026. Reports forwarded to Chair and Vice Chair.

Safety Concerns a Safety Officer Can’t Fix
Antagonistic Conduct by Fire Commissioners

Board members have repeatedly engaged in unprofessional conduct during public meetings and within the firehouse. In one instance, a Commissioner stood up with fists clenched in a posture suggesting readiness for a physical altercation with another Commissioner. In another instance, a Commissioner was observed providing incorrect operational direction to on duty officers and firefighters, resulting in a verbal confrontation that concluded with the statement, “I’m a Commissioner, so you have to do what I say.”

This behavior creates confusion, undermines officer authority, and has had a direct negative impact on volunteer morale.

Breakdown of Chain of Command

There is no clearly defined or communicated chain of command. The department currently has no appointed Chief, and there has been no public or internal communication regarding who will assume that role. The current Acting Chief is known to be slated for demotion, which has significantly eroded respect for their authority. Additionally, individuals expected to become future line officers are acting in those roles without formal appointment by the Board of Fire Commissioners. As a result, firefighters are seeking direction from individuals who do not officially hold command authority, by-passing the established chain of command. On at least one occasion, this confusion contributed to firefighters walking off the job.

There is also no designated Training Officer. Volunteers do not know who has authority to approve training, education, or certifications, creating delays and discouraging participation.

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Lack of Approved and Clearly Defined SOPs/SOGs

Standard Operating Procedures and Standard Operating Guidelines are essential to firefighter safety and operational consistency. The District’s SOPs and SOGs are currently disorganized, with no clear indication of which versions are in effect. Multiple draft SOPs and SOGs have been submitted to the Director over the past year, yet none have been presented to the Board for review or approval.
The Board has not substantively addressed operational SOPs or SOGs outside of Board specific policies. This lack of formally adopted guidance exposes members to unnecessary risk and places officers in an untenable position when attempting to enforce procedures that may not be officially in effect.

Inference of Systemic Noncompliance in Officer Appointment Procedures

To date, no procedure outlined by the Board for officer appointments has been followed with respect to my own position. I have not been interviewed, consulted, or formally evaluated despite the Safety Officer role being directly implicated in operational risk and regulatory compliance.

Given that the same appointment process was used for other anticipated line officer positions, and that the Board has already acknowledged procedural failures requiring interviews to be redone, it is reasonable to conclude that required procedures may not have been consistently followed for other appointments as well. This raises concerns regarding the legitimacy of pending appointments and further contributes to uncertainty within the chain of command and overall departmental stability.

Deterioration of Firefighter Morale and Resulting Operational Impact

Firefighter morale has measurably declined. Multiple members have stated that they submitted no availability for January scheduling in order to avoid the firehouse environment until leadership and governance issues are resolved. These decisions were described as intentional rather than the result of routine scheduling conflicts.

Contributing factors include repeated instances of non-officer personnel providing incorrect operational direction to on-duty officers and firefighters, followed by confrontational exchanges. In addition, directives issued by current command staff have been disregarded by some members due to a perceived lack of authority, stemming from the absence of a formally appointed officer position for that role during the current year.

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This environment has resulted in reduced availability, diminished confidence in leadership, and erosion of command authority. These conditions negatively affect staffing reliability, training participation, and emergency response readiness, and represent a safety concern that cannot be mitigated by the Safety Officer alone. Corrective action at the Board level is required.

Closing Statement

The conditions described above represent a cumulative and escalating safety risk. Leadership instability, failure to follow Board-adopted policy, breakdown of the chain of command, lack of approved operational SOPs/SOGs, and declining firefighter morale are not abstract concerns. They directly affect decision making, staffing, training, and emergency response performance.

If these conditions are allowed to persist, it is not a question of whether a serious injury or line-of-duty death could occur, but when. These risks are foreseeable, documented, and preventable.

As Department Safety Officer, I am formally advising that corrective action at the Board level is required. Failure to act places responsibility for the resulting risk squarely outside the authority and control of the Safety Officer.

Tim Young
Department Safety Officer